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Thursday, April 27, 2017

FCC Chair Ajit Pai Announces Bullshit Plan to Destroy Net Neutrality

FCC Chair Ajit Pai Announces Bullshit Plan to Destroy Net Neutrality: "if Pai wants to enact a rule that will survive a legal challenge, he’ll have to show it isn’t an “arbitrary and capricious” reversal of policy, under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Or, as we outlined previously, it’s possible that Pai’s move to open rulemaking is intended to pressure Democrats on the Hill into making a bad deal on new net neutrality-related legislation.

If the threat of a rule change does bring Democrats to the bargaining table, that too is unlikely to result in strong regulation. Any deal that can pass a Republican majority in both houses and Trump in the White House would likely be favorable to ISPs and Philip Berenbroick, senior policy counsel at Public Knowledge, told Gizmodo that “a bad deal legislatively is the worst outcome here.”" 'via Blog this'

5 Things to Know About the Next Battle Over Net Neutrality | Variety

5 Things to Know About the Next Battle Over Net Neutrality | Variety: "While Pai is in favor of the repeal of title II, what is unclear is what kind of rules would replace the current ones. He has reportedly looked at an approach in which ISPs would voluntarily agree to a set of guidelines, but that would fall far short of what longtime activists have sought. That’s why so many activists say that Pai’s attack on title II is an attack on net neutrality itself.

 He plans to reveal the full proposal on Thursday, and the FCC would then vote on May 18 to officially kick off a proceeding to gather public comment. Pai indicated that a final vote would come later this year." 'via Blog this'

Net Neutrality Alive and Well in Canada: CRTC Crafts Full Code With Zero Rating Decision - Michael Geist

Net Neutrality Alive and Well in Canada: CRTC Crafts Full Code With Zero Rating Decision - Michael Geist: "The Commission established its first net neutrality policy response in 2009 with the Internet traffic management practices. The rules restrict content blocking or slowdowns and require ISPs to disclose how they manage their networks. T

he issue expanded into zero rating in 2013 when Ben Klass, a graduate student in telecommunications, filed a complaint with the CRTC over how Bell approach to its Mobile TV product.

 In January 2015, the CRTC released its decision in the case, siding with Klass. The Commission expressed concern that the service “may end up inhibiting the introduction and growth of other mobile TV services accessed over the Internet, which reduces innovation and consumer choice.”

 Today’s decision largely completes the process by providing a framework for examining future zero rating or differential pricing cases (and rejecting Videotron’s music service plan in an accompanying decision). The ruling opens by examining whether differential pricing (of which zero rating is a form) raises concerns regarding preferences or disadvantages.  The Commission concludes that it often does" 'via Blog this'

Friday, April 21, 2017

Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2017-104: Paras 126-129 on #zerorating

Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2017-104 | CRTC: "Evaluation criteria

 In the context of evaluating whether a differential pricing practice is compliant with subsection 27(2) of the Act, the Commission has established evaluation criteria that will provide all stakeholders, particularly ISPs, with a degree of predictability. The Commission will consider the following evaluation criteria in any future analysis of whether a differential pricing practice involves an undue or unreasonable preference or disadvantage:

The agnostic treatment of data. The Commission will consider the extent to which data traffic is priced or rated equally or agnostically by an ISP with regard to its customers’ retail Internet access services, while having regard to the amount of data involved. Offerings that rate or price data non-agnostically, such as by zero-rating data traffic from certain content providers (including affiliated entities), are likely to raise concerns under subsection 27(2). Differential pricing practices that treat data traffic agnostically (e.g. time-of-day offerings) are not likely to raise the same level of concern.

The exclusiveness of the offering. The Commission will consider the extent to which a differential pricing practice is exclusive to a particular class or group of subscribers, or to a particular content provider or class or group of content providers, while also having regard to the number of subscribers or content providers affected. For example, differential pricing practices that are exclusive to subscribers to a particular data plan are likely to raise concerns under subsection 27(2).

The impact on Internet openness and innovation. The Commission will consider the extent to which a differential pricing practice inhibits or compromises the openness of the Internet for Canadians and the choices available to Canadians. In particular, this analysis will consider (a) whether a differential pricing practice affects the ability of content providers or innovators to enter the market by creating barriers to entry, and (b) the extent to which a differential pricing practice affects innovation. For example, differential pricing practices that require content providers to conform to administrative and technical requirements that are burdensome, costly, or time-consuming to meet are likely to raise concerns under subsection 27(2). Differential pricing practices that favour large, established content providers over smaller ones and new entrants are also likely to raise concerns.

Whether there is financial compensation involved. The Commission will consider whether a differential pricing practice results in financial compensation or other financial benefits between a content provider and an ISP or third-party sponsor (including affiliated entities), having regard to the amount of compensation involved and the extent of the financial interest with any affiliated entity. For example, sponsored data arrangements, where an ISP receives payment from a content provider in exchange for zero-rating the data traffic to and from that provider, are likely to raise concerns under subsection 27(2).

In applying these criteria, the Commission will give primary consideration to the agnostic treatment of data, since differential pricing practices that favour certain content at the expense of other content have the greatest potential for harm. The Commission will look to the other three criteria as additional considerations in any evaluation of a differential pricing practice.

None of the four evaluation criteria will necessarily be determinative on its own, as each assessment of a differential pricing practice will be fact-specific. The weight given to each criterion may also vary from case to case, depending on the circumstances.

Finally, the Commission will consider whether there are exceptional circumstances that demonstrate clear benefits to the public interest and/or minimal harm associated with a differential pricing practice. For example, the Commission may consider whether there are privacy-related, technological, administrative, or other factors that would impact its analysis under subsection 27(2) such that the benefits of allowing a specific differential pricing practice would clearly outweigh any harms." 'via Blog this'

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

ACM SIGCOMM Workshop (2016) on Hot Topics in Middleboxes and Network Function Virtualization (HotMiddlebox 2016) - ACM SIGCOMM 2016

ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Middleboxes and Network Function Virtualization (HotMiddlebox 2016) - ACM SIGCOMM 2016: "Modern networks heavily rely on advanced in network processing for a wide spectrum of crucial functions ranging from security through traffic management, all the way to Voice over IP (just to name few). Until recently, these network functions were implemented in dedicated hardware "middleboxes" spread within the network. However, the strive to reduce cost and increase agility is motivating a major shift to a paradigm where software-based processing is done over virtualized, shared platforms built on commodity hardware servers, switches, and storage.

This trend towards virtualized middleboxes, called Network Function Virtualization, NFV, with the use of Software Defined Networks, SDN to control the network flows is gaining popularity in the telecommunication industry as well as in academia. Yet, this paradigm shift is at a very early stage and many interesting questions remain open in this regard. " 'via Blog this'

Monday, April 17, 2017

Private Eye Media News: Sky Q degrading BBC iPlayer?

Private Eye Media News: "BOULTON WONDERER…
Sky’s Adam Boulton blames the Beeb when he can’t find an interview with the PM on iPlayer – but his access problems have more to do with Sky’s whizzy new Q box." 'via Blog this'

BBC should NOT necessarily occupy top EPG spot - Elstein

BBC should NOT necessarily occupy top EPG spot |: "Elstein says Purnell’s answer is to ask the UK parliament to force on-demand services to provide “due prominence” for public service catch-up offerings “like iPlayer”.

“This “like” is another weaselly formulation, as the only catch-up service from the designated public service broadcasters (BBC, ITV1, Channel 4 and Five) that provides exclusively public service content is – the iPlayer.

The equivalent services from ITV, Channel 4 and Five all include an array of programmes that never appeared on their public service channels: content from ITV2, ITV3, ITV4, E4, More4, 5USA and so on that are nothing to do with public service television, including all the programmes acquired from abroad that are not even British (which is true of the iPlayer, too). Why should any platform be forced to give these services ‘due prominence’” asks Elstein.

 Elstein concludes by saying it is highly unlikely that today’s Culture, Media & Sport ministry will demand changes to the current status quo. “The Digital Economy Bill is likely to pass with no such encumbrances. But that has never stopped the BBC asking,” states Elstein." 'via Blog this'